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Abstract—In the 21st century, cyber-based attackers such as
advance persistent threats are leveraging bots in the form of
botnets to conduct a plethora of cyber-attacks. While there are
several social engineering techniques used to get targets to
unknowingly download these bots, it is the command-and-control
techniques advance persistent threats use to control their bots that
is of critical interest to the author. In this research paper, the
author aims to develop a command-and-control microservice
application programming interface infrastructure to facilitate
botnet command-and-control attack simulations. To achieve this
the author will develop a simple bot skeletal framework, utilize the
latest in API development frameworks, and simulate 2 types of
malicious cyber-attacks. The attacks will be in the form of data
exfiltration and data encryption. The author realizes that there
needs to be quantitative data aggregation on the performance of
the API and malicious bots. The author will be designing and
developing a system to achieve this goal as part of their future
work.
Keywords—Application Programming Interface, API, Advance
Persistent Threat, APT, Bot, Command and Control, C2, C&C,
Cybersecurity, Data Encryption, Data Exfiltration, Malware, Social
Engineering

I. INTRODUCTION
With the near seamless ubiquitous computing in current
modern society, we interact with computing bots in greater
ratios than with actual human beings. This is in the form of
chatbots that perform mundane customer service or routine
transactions. A recent Imperva, “Bad Bot Report 2021: The
Pandemic of the Internet” report, states that they account for
roughly 15.2% of Internet traffic. What’s alarming with the
report is the steadily increase in malicious bot traffic which
accounted for 25.6% of Internet traffic, while humans took the
rest with a not surprising 59.2%. As attackers become more
sophisticated in their attack strategies, so too do the malicious
bots they develop. Imperva categorizes these bots as Advanced
Persistent Bots or APBs.
Based on research from the MITRE Foundation on the
tactics, techniques, and procedures of Advance Persistent
Threats use of malicious bots, their command-and-control
mechanisms, and open-source intelligence, the author aims to
design, architect, and engineer a command-and-control

microservice application programming interface from which to
simulate Advance Persistent Bot attacks.
The author chose this project direction to achieve the
following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Expand the author’s skills, knowledge, and experience
in designing, architecting, and engineering a full-scale
application programming interface.
Strengthen my knowledge of Advanced Persistent
Threat Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
Strengthen my knowledge of Command-and-Control
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures used by Advanced
Persistent Threats.
Fortify the author’s technical skillsets.
The author will be packaging this project into an API as
a Service (APIaaS) and will only be proving this service
on the Silk Road, a darknet marketplace. The author
plans on only accepting all major cryptocurrencies.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
(Background & Related Work) provides an overview of the
different technologies used in designing and developing the
author’s project, current research on Advanced Persistent
Threats, bot and botnets, command-and-control, and social
engineering. Section 3 (Proposed Work) provides an
overview of the work the author is proposing, which include
Application
Programming Interface Infrastructure,
Bot/Botnet Framework, Malware Capabilities, and Social
Engineering Scenarios. Section 4 (Preliminary & Expected
Results) provides an overview of the previous evaluations of
current capabilities of the technologies being planned on
utilizing in the project and the author’s expected results for
the remainder of the project. Finally, Section 5 (Conclusion
& Future Work) concludes and details the author’s future
direction for the project.
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
In the following sub-sections of the Background & Related
Work, the author provides an overview of the history and current
status of application programming interface methodology,
application programming interface frameworks such as Django
and Flask, Advanced Persistent Threats, Bot & Botnets,
Command-and-Control, and finally Social Engineering.

A. Application Programming Interface (API)
The modern usage of application programming interface can
be defined as a connection between two or more applications,
services, programs, systems, or other application programming
interfaces, which are used to send and receive data and content.
This is achieved through the simple POST and GET request
functions of application programming interfaces. Application
programming interface has been utilized since computing has
been available to society. If it wasn’t for Roy Fielding’s doctoral
dissertation call “Architectural Styles and the Design of
Network-based Software Architectures” and technology
companies such as Salesforce, eBay, and Amazon did
application programming interfaces become widespread usage
and evolution. Since its small beginnings in commercial
applications, application programming interfaces now drive
desktop applications, majority of web applications, mobile
applications, and low-code to no-code applications. Below are
two of the current application programming interface
frameworks being utilized in modern application programming
interface solutions.
1) Django
Django is a modern Python web application framework that
supports a full-fledge application programming interface
development environment. It was first developed between 2003
– 2005 by a team of web developers from a newspaper company.
This framework emerged from the continued re-factoring and
re-use of code they used to develop multiple websites for the
company. They eventually packaged the framework into an
open-source project in 2005. Django believes in enabling rapid
development of secure and maintainable web applications. This
is achieved through being fully packaged with all the tools and
resources a developer needs to accomplish their development
goals, being versatile by support multiple formats such as
HTML, RSS, JSON, XML, YAML, and more, being secure by
enabling defaults protections from popular web application
attacks such as SQL injections, cross-site scripting, cross-site
forgery, and clickjacking [9, 10].
2) Flask
Flask is another modern Python web application framework
originally designed and developed by Armin Ronacher as an
April Fool’s Day joke in 2010, but quickly became a full fledge
framework because of the popularity. It is considered more
Pythonic and faster in development versus Django. This is due
to its microframework designation, which means that the
primary package is a barebones framework only including the
essentials for web applications development and to gain features
such as authentication, database ORM, input validation and
sanitation, the developer must import, i.e., download those
feature functionalities [11 – 16]. Flask is built on three primary
technologies: Web Server Gateway Interface (WSGI),
Werkzeug, and jinja2 [13 – 14]. A brief overview of these
technologies follows:
a) Web Server Gateway Interface (WSGI): A Python
standard for web application development, enabling common
interface between web servers and web applications.

b) Werkzeug: A Web Server Gateway Interface (WSGI)
toolkit that implements requests, response objects, and utility
functality.
c) jinja2: A Python template engine used for web
templating which combines a template with specified data
sources to render dynamic webpages.
B. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
Advanced Persistent Threats are an evolution of the
traditional practice of spying with enhanced capabilities due to
technological advances. The first recorded research on
Advanced Persistent Threat emerged back in 2010 outlined their
characteristics including methods, detections, and defense
techniques [1 – 8]. The findings from subsequent research in
Advanced Persistent Threats detailed their general organization,
sophistication, concealment, and purpose. While many
Advanced Persistent Threats have different objectives and goals,
they all share these characteristics [5 – 8]. Chen et al. [8]
provides a detailed analysis of these characteristics in the
following:
a) Organizing: purpose – APT actors are well-organized
teams that appear to be directly or indirectly supported by
governments, making them more resourceful and organized than
traditional actors.
b) Sophistication: APTs are implemented through a series
of properly plotted activities, from spear phishing, malware
injection, data transmission to trace clearance. The multiplicity
of attack channels and mechanisms significantly increased the
success rate of compromise.
c) Concealment: actors lurk in the target network and
disguise activities as normal ones and could update the malware
without being noticed.
d) Purpose: traditional actors typically pursuit financial
gains from victims, but APTs aim at confidential information in
the firms or government agencies.
C. Bot/Botnet
As it relates to code-based software, a bot is a software that
is programming to perform scheduled actions. The bot is
primarily automated, which means once deployed it will do all
the tasks without human interaction. There are several
applications that a bot can perform, including chatbot-ing, web
crawling, socialbot-ing, and being a malicious bot. The
malicious bot is one of the author’s primary focuses on this
project [20 – 28]. Malicious bots can form several automated
cyber-based actions (attacks) which is of great interest, they
include:
a) Credential Stuffing
b) Web Scraping
c) Denial of Service (DoS) & Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) Attacks
d) Brute Force Attacks
When multiple bots are linked together into a coordinated
attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service Attacks via a
command-and-control intermediate, they are considered botnets
[20 – 28]. Based on research in botnet characteristics, lifecycle,
and taxonomy [20 – 28], there are defining concepts which are
critical
to
the
author’s
development
of

CH4RL3SCH4L3M4GN3. These concepts are the lifecycle of
botnets [21 – 24] which are outlined below:
a) Spreading & Injection: This is the initial entry phase of
the bot. The bot or attacker will utitlize different methods and
techniques such as social engineering to infect the target with
the bot.
b) Communications Stage (also considered the
Command-and-Control Stage): In this stage the bot or botnet
will establish communications to the command-and-control
server. In other words, the bots or botnet will listen to the
command-and-control servers or connect to them periodically
to get new commands from the command-and-control server. A
new command when detected by the bots or botnet is treated as
an order which they will then execute the order and the results
are reported to the command-and-control server; the bots or
botnets then wait for new commands.
c) Attack Stage: In this final stage of the lifecycle the bot
or botnet will execute the attack plan given by the commandand-control server. The bot or botnet will start to attack the
targets according to the transmitted commands.
D. Command and Control (C2)
In in the context of Cybersecurity, a command-and-control
server is a computer (usually a server or multiple servers) under
the control of malicious cyber-based attackers (usually
Advanced Persistent Threats) [29 – 33]. Command-and-control
servers are used primarily as the intermediary to communicate
with malicious bots or botnets, disseminate malicious software,
exfiltrate stole data, and conduct a multitude of other cyberbased attacks. There are a multiple of different command-andcontrol topologies used by malicious attackers [29 – 31]. These
include the following:
a) Centralized (Hierarchical) Model: In a centralized or
hierarchical model malicious attackers will user other bots or
botnets as proxy servers for their command-and-control servers.
It does reduce the number of bots or botnets that need to be
aware of the location of the centralized server. It can be a
compromised machine or a legitimate Internet service provider.
When the victim is infected, it will communicate to the
command-and-control server and then will wait or check for
pending commands.
b) Decentralized (Random) Model: In a decentralized or
random model the primary command-and-control server can
send commands from any bot within the network. Attack
commands are issued via an authoritative bot. These commands
are often tagged as authoritative, which tells the issuing bot to
automatically propagate the commands to all other bots or
botnets.
c) Hybrid (Multi) Model: In a hybrid or multi model the
malicious attacker can implement a combination of centralized
and decentralized models. There are advantages and
disadvantages of this implementation. The advantages are the
attackers can hide their communications protocols and botnet
architecture from detection. The disadvantages are the attackers
must design, manage, and maintain new hybrid model designs
as each successive design becomes detected and intelligence
published on them.

There are several different communications protocols used
by command-and-control servers to communicate with their
bots or botnets []. These include the following:
d) Internet Relay Chat (IRC): Internet relay chat is mainly
designed for group and simple client and server communication
via communication mediums called channels. This is a very
flexible protocol and with several open-source implementations
of this protocol, enables malicious attackers to extend it in a way
that suit their needs.
e) Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) & Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS): HTTP & HTTPS is another
communications protocol used by malicious attackers because
enables malicious attackers to bypass security appliances. The
main advantage of using the HTTP & HTTPS protocol is hiding
bot and botnet traffics into normal endpoint user web traffics, so
it can easily bypass firewalls with port-based filtering
mechanisms and avoid IDS detection.
f) Peer-to-Peer (P2P): Recently more advanced bots and
botnets have begun to use P2P decentralized communications.
A variant of Phatbot used code from WASTE5 that implements
an encrypted P2P protocol designed for private messaging and
file transfer among a small number of trusted parties.
The author also surveyed a multitude of open-source
command-and-control frameworks to evaluate their capabilities
and effectiveness [31]. In the follow analysis, the author outlines
each open-source command-and-control framework:
g) Metasploit: Metasploit is a very powerful tool which
can be used by malicious attackers as well as ethical hackers to
probe systematic vulnerabilities on networks and servers.
Because it is an open-source framework, it can be easily
customized and used with modern operating systems. Some of
the capabilities available by Metasploit include command shell
payloads that enable users to run scripts or random commands
against a host, dynamic payloads that allow testers to generate
unique payloads to evade antivirus software, and Static
payloads that enable port forwarding and communications
between networks.
h) Empire: Empire was created by Veris Group security
practitioners Will Schroeder, Justin Warner, Matt Nelson and
others in 2015. Empire is a unique attack framework in that its
capabilities and behaviors closely resemble those used by
current nation state advanced persistent threat actors. Empire
is effective at evading security solutions, operating in a covert
manner, and enabling attackers’ total control over
compromised systems. Empire command-and-control traffic is
asynchronous, encrypted, and designed to blend in with normal
network activity, making it exceptionally difficult for
cybersecurity teams to identify Empire command-and-control
traffic in the enterprise.
i) Pupy: Pupy is a cross-platform post-exploitation tool
and capable of low detection operations. It’s written in Python
which makes it very convenient. Pupy can communicate using
multiple kinds of transport, migrate into processes using
reflective injection, and load remote python code, python
packages and python C-extensions from memory.
E. Social Engineering (SE)
In the field of Cybersecurity, social engineering is the
intersection of psychological manipulations through

technological and non-technological mediums. To provide a
universal understanding on the definition of social engineering,
the author will be referencing the extensive research from Muton
et al. and their work on defining the social engineering domain
[42]. Mouton et al. defines “Social Engineering” stating, “The
science of using social interaction as a means to persuade an
individual or an organization to comply with a specific request
from an attacker where either the social interaction, the
persuasion or the request involves a computer-related entity.”
Mouton et al. also defines the individual conducting the social
engineering attack as well as the definition of the act of the
attack. Mouton et al. defines a “Social engineer (noun)” as “An
individual or group who performs an act of Social Engineering,”
and also a “Social engineer (verb)” as “To perform an act of
Social Engineering. When the verb is used in the Past Perfect
form, it means a successful Social Engineering attack has
occurred. For example, “The target may not know that he or she
has been social engineered.”.” While Mouton et al. defines a
“Social Engineering attack” as “A Social Engineering attack
employs either direct communication or indirect
communication, and has a social engineer, a target, a medium, a
goal, one or more principles and one or more techniques.” The
definition for a social engineering attack is also backed by
Ivaturi et al.’s breaks-down of the taxonomy of social
engineering attacks [41]. With these terms defined, readers will
improve their understanding of the social engineering scenarios
the author developed in Section 3.
In the next section, the author outlines their proposed work
for the design, development, and engineering for the Application
Programming Interface Infrastructure, Bot/Botnet Framework,
Malware Capabilities, and Social Engineering Scenarios.
III. PROPOSED WORK
A. Application Programming Interface Infrastructure
The author is proposing designing and developing
CH4RL3SCH4L3M4GN3 application programming interface
on the Flask and Flask-RESTful Framework. The author chose
this Python Framework due to its scalability and lightweight
packaging. This will facilitate the capabilities the author is
aiming to develop for the Bot/Botnet Framework and Malware
Capabilities with the timeframe of 5 – 6 months. These
frameworks will allow the author to escalate design and develop,
as well as test for edge cases and debug.
B. Bot/Botnet Framework
Based on prior and current research in bot and botnet
architecture [20 – 28]. The author is proposing designing and
developing a scaled-down architecture of current and nextgeneration bot and botnets. The author is aiming to have at least
four bots communicating with the application programming
interface. As seen in figure 1, CH4RL3SCH4L3M4GN3 is the
primary application programming interface that will
decentralize its capabilities to three servers, while also being
able to communicate with each other. The initial communication
server address will be pre-defined to the malicious bot but will
be override once the malicious bot receives its attack
instructions. The author is aiming to develop a communications
obfuscation technique to increase the effectiveness of the
malicious bot.

CH4RL3SCH4L3M4GN3
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Figure I: Bot | Botnet Framework

C. Malware Capabilities
In the following two sections, Data Encryption and Data
Exfiltration, the author is proposing designing and developing
two malware capabilities that will be provided to the malicious
bot by the application programming interface. The author chose
data encryption and data exfiltration because research shows
these are the primary attacks being carried out by Advanced
Persistent Threats [1 – 8]. Data encryption is typically
implemented in the form of Ransomware [1 – 8]. Data
exfiltration takes the form of multiple mediums, examples of
these include emails, http/https, and usb drives [37 – 40].
1) Data Encryption
The author is proposing designing a data encryption malware
capability that will encrypt victim machines using symmetric
encryption. The author chose this cryptographic algorithm
because the author wishes to cause the most damage upon victim
endpoints. The primary symmetric encryption the author will be
utilizing will be AES [34 – 36]. To provide a tentative network
communication of the data encryption attack bot, figure 2a
provides this detail. In figure 2a, once the attack bot has
achieved access to the victim machine, it will start a
communications channel via HTTP/HTTPS to communicate to
an identity repository to retrieve its attack identity. This is used
to communicate back to the application programming interface;
to retrieve its attack plan. The attack bot’s identity is used to
authenticate itself to the application programming interface.
Once it has retrieved its data encryption attack instructions, it
will commence its attack until complete. Once its attack has
carried out, it will terminate communications to the application
programming interface and kill itself.
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VICTIM

API

CRUB
DATABASE
Figure 2.a: Data Encryption

To provide a more detailed understanding of the attack logic
of the attack bot, figure 2b provides a flowchart of the data
encryption instruction set. The attack bot will try to open a
communications channel to the identity repository for a
maximum of 5 tries, if it cannot communicate to the identity
repository, it will terminate all processes and kill itself. If it can
retrieve its identity from the repository, it will try to
communicate to the application programming interface. It will
try for a maximum of 5 tries, if it cannot communicate to the
application programming interface, it will terminate all
processes and kill itself. Finally, if it can retrieve its data
encryption attack instructions, it will start encrypting its
designated directories until complete. Once done it will
terminate all processes and kill itself.
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Figure 3.a: Data Exfiltration

Similar to the attack instructions from figure 2b, figure 3b
provides a flowchart of the data exfiltration instruction set. The
attack bot will try to open a communications channel to the
identity repository for a maximum of 5 tries; if it cannot
communicate to the identity repository, it will terminate all
processes and kill itself. If it can retrieve its identity from the
repository, it will try to communicate to the application
programming interface. It will try for a maximum of 5 tries; if it
cannot communicate to the application programming interface,
it will terminate all processes and kill itself. Finally, if it can
retrieve its data exfiltration attack instructions, it will start
exfiltrating its designated directories until complete. Once done
it will terminate all processes and kill itself.
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Figure 2.b: Data Encryption Logic

2) Data Exfiltration
The author is proposing designing a data exfiltration
malware capability that will exfiltrate designated directories and
files over HTTP/HTTPS [37 – 40]. Similar to the attack
instructions from figure 2a, in figure 3a this attack includes an
additional instruction set to post exfiltrated data back to the
application programming interface. To give an overview again,
once the attack bot has achieved access to the victim machine, it
will start a communications channel via HTTP/HTTPS to
communicate to an identity repository to retrieve its attack
identity. This is used to communicate back to the application
programming interface to retrieve its attack plan. The attack
bot’s identity is used to authenticate itself to the application
programming interface. Once it has retrieved its data exfiltration
attack instructions, it will commence its attack until complete.
The malicious bot will exfiltrate 10 – 20 MB of data via Post
Requests to the application programming interface. Once its
target dataset has been exfiltrated, it will terminate all processes
and communication channels to the application programming
interface and finally kill itself.
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D. Social Engineering Scenario
Based on the social engineering attack scenario work
outlined and proposed by Nguyen et al [42 – 45], the author has
contributed to their social engineering attack scenario repository
with two new social engineering attack scenarios. In the
following the author created two specialized social engineering
attack scenarios for data encryption and data exfiltration.
1) Higher Education Campus Vehicle Violation Ticketing
Attack
Description: Social engineer creates replicated parking
violation notices and places them onto student vehicles with the
higher education institution’s footprint. The owners of the
vehicles find the notice and later navigate to the provided URL
on the citation. The target is deceived to travers to a replicated
malicious institutional portal, which will drive-by install a

malicious bot onto their computerized system. In addition, the
malicious website will harvest students’ institutional credentials.

institution's public safety website, as well as list
primary, secondary, and tertiary locations to
maximize the attack zone.

Components
Communication Channel: Indirect Communication
Social Engineer: Social engineer is an individual

Step III: Preparation
I.

Target: Higher Education Institution Students
Medium: Parking Violation Citation, Technology-Based
Goal: Get victim to traverse to the malicious website, get
malicious bot downloaded, and harvest credentials
Compliance Principles: Social Compliance & Authority
Technique: Phishing & Baiting
Phases
Step I: Attack Formulation
I.
II.

II.

Goal Identification: The goal is to get victims to
traverse to the malicious website, get malicious bot
downloaded, and harvest credentials.
Target Identification: The target of the attack
scenario are any students within the higher
education institution that own vehicles.

Step II: Information Gathering
I.

II.

III.

Identify Potential Sources: Potential intelligence
sources include but not limited to higher education
institution's public facing internet website, social
media accounts, and physical reconnaissance. The
institution's public facing website allows the SE to
gather information on their specific parking
violation policy, parking decal or makings, public
institutional parking lot locations, student
dormitory locations, faculty and employee
designated parking lots, and institutional footprint
maps. Institution's social media account will allow
the SE to gather relevant information on the
institution's public safety department and
intelligence on their employees. Physical
reconnaissance includes foot and vehicular
reconnaissance. Reconnaissance allows the SE to
monitor personnel movement, gathering locations,
and visually inspect public safety personnel.
Gather Information from Sources: Gather
intelligence from above mention potential sources
that directly relate to the target's movement pattern,
high traffic locations, areas of least security patrols,
institutional parking decal or markings, and
importantly obtain an authentic institutional
parking violation ticket for replication.
Assess Gathered Information: Determine which
location to scatter parking violation tickets that is
relevant to the specific parking lot location, i.e.,
student lot, faculty lot, contractor lot, employee lot,
and visitor lot. Ensure the simulated violation is
within the standards and policies enforced within
the institution's footprint. In parallel, determine if
enough intelligence gathered to replicate the

Combination & Analysis of Gathered
Information: Determine the best time slots during
which the SE can attempt to deploy the parking
violation tickets in the SE's primary, secondary and
tertiary locations. The SE will ensure to keep
themselves anonymous whilst deploying the
parking violation tickets, such as evading roaming
security, close circuit cameras, and valid
individuals of the institution that could question the
SE's actions. It is also critical in deploying the
parking violation tickets during a time of low
human traffic in the attack zone.
Development of an Attack Vector: A Social
engineer when developing the attack vector must
detail the time and place of the attack to saturate the
largest target population. The social engineer must
ensure that the parking violation ticket is properly
created, and the cloned institutional website must
also be functioning and visually similar to the
actual one. Social engineer ensures the malicious
bot and credential harvesting capability is properly
configured and functioning.

Step IV: Develop Relationship
I.

II.

Establishment of Communication: The act of
deploying the parking violation tickets by the SE
lasts until the target recognizes and obtains the
parking violation ticket.
Rapport Building: The SE to properly build
rapport, the SE must ensure the parking violation
tickets looks similar to those that are typically used
by the institutional organization. This includes but
is not limited to the official branded logo on the
ticket, working, contact information, and citations
that are implicit within a higher education
institutional organization.

Step V: Exploit Relationship
I.

II.

Priming the Target: The parking violation ticket
should be realistic so that the owner of the vehicle
will take it seriously and not simply dismiss it while
driving home or to another location within the
institution's footprint and mentally prepare to
navigate to the institution's public safety website to
either resolve or appeal the violation. The target is
pressured to resolve the violation as soon as
possible due to social compliance to do the right
thing and the authority institutional public safety
has over vehicle violations.
Elicitation: The "elicitation" step is almost implicit
in this attack scenario. Most individuals will feel
urged to comply with parking violation ticket
requested actions. The provided institutional public
safety website URL will allow the target to
navigate to resolve the violation. Once the target

navigates to the malicious website, a malicious bot
is automatically installed on the target's
computerized system.

I.

Step VI:
I.

II.

III.

Maintenance: The parking violation ticket and
institutional public safety website should be created
in such a way that provides the target a sense of
ease and trust. The parking violation ticket and
website should replicate the real one utilized by the
higher education institution. This will provide
assurance to the target that the parking violation
ticket is valid and their actions in resolving the
violation is correct.
Transition: The SE utilizes the replicated
institutional public safety website to automatically
install a malicious bot to then pivot to other attack
scenarios. Thus, the SE can then proceed to the
"goal satisfaction" step.
Goal Satisfaction: The SE has attained their initial
goal of gaining an unauthorized bot onto the
target’s computerized systems.

II.

III.

2) Higher Education Technology Lab Attack
Description: A social engineer pretends to be a student
research assistant to a faculty member and convinces the
institution’s public safety officer to remotely unlock an
unauthorized computer laboratory. SE gains access to the
institution’s computerized terminal and infects the entire
laboratory computerized systems with a malicious bot.

Step III: Preparation
I.

Components
Communication Channel: Bidirectional Communication
Social Engineer: Social engineer is an individual

II.

Target: Primary target: Institutional laboratory facility,
Secondary target: Public Safety Department, Tertiary target:
Institutional faculty member
Medium: Telephonic device, Technology-based
Goal: Gain unauthorized access to the institution’s
laboratory facility
Compliance Principles: Consistency Principle
Phases
Step I: Attack Formulation
I.
II.

Goal Identification: Primary goal is to gain
unauthorized access to the institution's laboratory
facility.
Target Identification: Primary target of the attack
is the institution's laboratory facilities; secondary
target is the institution’s public safety officer, and
the tertiary target is any faculty member that has the
authority to access specified server room.

Step II: Information Gathering

Combination & Analysis of Gathered
Information: Determine the specific laboratory
facility, specific faculty member, time slot, and the
required information to provide to public safety
department.
Development of an Attack Vector: Develop an
attack plan detailed to the specific time and location
to conduct the attack. Prepare a detailed list of
information required to provide the public safety
department, and conversation script with primary,
secondary and tertiary courses of action. Social
engineer ensures the malicious bot is properly
configured and functioning.

Step IV: Develop Relationship
I.

Technique: Pretexting

Identify Potential Sources: Potential intelligence
source is the institution's public website, social
media accounts, public safety policies, information
pertaining to the public safety department, physical
reconnaissance. Physical reconnaissance includes
drive-by and roaming reconnaissance of laboratory
locations, and security implementations.
Gather Information from Sources: Gather all the
information from the above sources. SE is required
to find sources of information that directly relate to
how to gain access to the unauthorized laboratory
facility.
Assess Gathered Information: Determine the
process in which to gain access to the unauthorized
laboratory facility from the public safety
department. Compile the specific information that
faculty members are required to provide to the
public safety officer. Type of faculty members that
are authorized to access specified laboratory
facility within the institution. Since it is
technology-based medium, the SE will compile the
types of information that is required by the public
safety department to identify the faculty member.
Detailed mapping and route of the location of all
server facilities within the institution. Timeline of
when faculty members are usually accessing the
laboratory facility.

II.

Establishment of Communication: Social
engineer initiates communication by physically
calling the public safety office, up to the moment
where the secondary target assists the attacker in
unlocking the laboratory facility door.
Rapport Building: Social engineer is required to
develop a friendly relationship with the secondary
target (public safety office) who has authority to
grant access to the laboratory facility. Intent is to
develop trust between the social engineer and
secondary target.

Step V: Exploit Relationship
I.

Priming the Target: Social engineer who is
impersonating the tertiary target’s (faculty
member) student research assistant urgently needs

II.

access to the server room to conduct research
calculations to meet deadlines with contracted
companies.
Elicitation: Social engineer explains to the
secondary target (public safety officer) that he/she
forgot his/her access card to the server room across
campus (in their office). It would take too long and
inconvenient for the tertiary target’s (faculty
member) student research assistant to go back and
grab the access card.

START

API
Create bot identity

GIT UPDATE
ID REPO

GIT REPO

II.

III.

ATK ID &
PLAN

API
Create bot attack plan

Step VI:
I.

POST BOT
IDENTITY

POST BOT ATK
PLAN

HTTP / HTTPS
WAIT

Maintenance: After the social engineer has
successfully gained access to the unauthorized
server room. The tertiary target’s (faculty member)
student research assistant generously thanks the
secondary target (public safety officer) for his/her
ability to assist in authorizing the secondary target's
access.
Transition: Since the social engineer was able to
gain access to the unauthorized server room, the
social engineer can now proceed to the "Goal
Satisfaction" stage.
Goal Satisfaction: SE has accomplished his/her
original goal of gaining unauthorized access to the
institution's laboratory facility.

E. Command and Control Framework
The author proposes the design and development of a
command-and-control application programming interface
framework from which to facilitate the attack of the project’s
bots/botnets. As seen in figure four, the author developed the
initial logical flow of the command-and-control application
programming interface. As we step through the logic of the
command-and-control application programming interface, the
author will be developing automation capabilities for all of the
functions proposed. The application programming interface will
create all bot identities based on a secret key and value pair. All
identities will be posted to an internal create, read, update, and
delete database. Once bot identity is created, it will be
automatically pushed to a publicly facing Git repository. This
repository can either be GitHub or GitLab. In parallel, the
application programming interface will be generating malicious
attack plan association with the newly created bot identity.
These attack plans are pulled from an existing attack dataset
released for open intelligence. Once the automation of the
administrative work is complete, the application programming
interface will sit and wait for bots to phone home to initiate a
handshake. If no bots have phoned home, the application
programming interface will continue to sit there waiting. If the
bot has phoned home and is the initial handshake, the application
programming interface will associate their identity to the attack
plan in the create, read, update, delete database, and send those
attack plans back to the malicious bot. If it is not the first
handshake and the malicious bot needs to post data to the
specified create, read, update database, it will do so; otherwise,
the application will continue to wait for the next
communications with the bot.

NO

NO

HAS BOT
COMM BACK?

YES

NEW
HANDSHAKE?

SEND BOT ATK
PLAN

YES

NO

NEEDS TO
POST DATA?

POST DATA

CRUD
DB

Figure IV: Command & Control Logic

IV. PRELIMINARY / EXPECTED RESULTS
A. Preliminary
As outlined in this paper’s Background & Related Work’s
API section, the author analyzed two of the current leading
Python REST API Frameworks, and a new modern API centered
framework. During first round of evaluations of Django’s REST
capabilities, it was apparent Django would not be a feasible
framework to develop the features the author proposed in their
Proposed Work section [9, 10]. The author acknowledges the
powerful capabilities that Django provides to developers. The
primary justifications to not develop with Django is its massive
code library that needed to be imported and its substantial lines
of code needed to initiate a skeletal API endpoint [9, 10]. In the
next round of evaluations of Python RESTFUL frameworks, the
author evaluated Flask [11 – 16]. Flask had better feature and
capabilities in API development to Django and showed great
promise. This was due to the innate nature of Flask as being a
micro-framework [11, 12, 16]. The author found that the
lightweight skeletal Flask framework and substantial modules to
extend its capabilities would allow for fast development and
maintenance. This is exemplified by the developers of the FlaskRESTful stating, “Flask-RESTful is an extension for Flask that
adds support for quickly building REST APIs. It is a lightweight
abstraction that works with your existing ORM/libraries. FlaskRESTful encourages best practices with minimal setup. If you
are familiar with Flask, Flask-RESTful should be easy to pick
up” [12]. In comparison to Django, Flask outclassed Django in
the number of lines of code needed to have a fully functioning
API endpoint up and running. While CH4RL3SCH4L3M4GN3
is currently in the early stages of development utilizing FlaskRESTful, the author is also considering adopting the latest
modern Python API framework FastAPI [17 – 19]. This modern
API focused framework was recently released in the Python
Package Index on 07 Oct 2021. It has a vibrant community and
multiple applications and sponsorships including but not limited
to ML/AI, Neural SaaS, and FinTech. The author is heavily

considering utilizing this modern API framework as the
architecture of CH4RL3SCH4L3M4GN3. More analysis and
testing need to be done before final adoption.

implementations but not all, and the last-resort plan will have
minimal implementation and will only provide development
code.

In regard to bot/botnet development, the author has scripted
a simple Python script that utilizes the built-in requests module
to facilitate communications to remote command and control
API. The author is currently considering design ideas based on
the research on bots/botnets [20 – 28]. This leads to the malware
capabilities development status, which will heavily influence the
design development of the malicious bot. The author chose to
develop two malware capabilities that encrypt data [34 – 36] and
exfiltrate data [37 – 40]. The author will be focused primarily on
symmetric encryption as the cryptographic scheme. The author
will develop a simple data exfiltration over HTTP/HTTPS
traffic via API CRUD operations.

B. Future Work
In the author’s future work, depending on the outcome of
this project, the author plans to bring this project from lab
simulation to live environment deployment. This will require the
acquisition of a public domain and server to host the project API.
The author realizes that there needs to be quantitative data
aggregation on the performance of the API and malicious bots.
The author will be designing and developing a system to achieve
this goal.

B. Expected Results
1) Primary Plan
The author’s primary plan is to have fully functioning attack
simulations designed and developed by the end of the project’s
timeline. The simulations will be based on the social engineer
attack scenarios proposed in the author’s Proposed Work, Social
Engineering Scenario section above. The attack plans carried out
by the malicious bots will be based on figure 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b.
The malicious bots and attack plans will be facilitated by the
command-and-control API, see figure 4.
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